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BANKS AND BANKING-BANK DEPOSITS AND THE N.I.L.-Plainti:ff sued H and W and a writ of garnishment was issued against B who
filed a disclosure of an indebtedness owing to Hand Was joint credi-
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tors. W was later dropped from the case by a voluntary non-suit.
Shortly ~er such dismissal, W applied to B for payment of the debt,
but payment was refused because of the outstanding garnishment. B,
however, expressed to W an intention, perhaps even an assurance, to
honor such application when freed of the garnishment. That garnishment was dismissed several days later, but in the meantime another
writ of garnishment in the pending suit was served upon B. Judgment
in the main action was rendered against H, and on the garnishment
hearing 1 it developed that B had not paid W because at the date of
application for payment the first garnishment writ was outstanding and
had not made payment upon dismissal of that writ because the second
writ had been served before release of the first; but that B considered
the money as belonging to W. The trial court entered judgment for
B, the garnishee defendant, the fund in B's hands being considered as
W's, on the proofs presented.
Such are the essential facts in a recent case decided by the Michigan
Supreme Court.2 In the case H and W are husband and wife and B is
a bank in which they had a "joint deposit." The application by J,V to
B for payment was made by the presentation of her check for the balance in the account. The bank declined to pay, as stated, but kept the
check "for collection," s pinning it to the account. The reviewing court
concluded that the trial court erred in holding that the wife "had established right and title to the funds in the joint account and in directing a
verdict for the garnishee bank." Wiest and Butzel, J. J ., dissented.
It is difficult to state with assurance just what the varying views of
the majority and minority really are. Mr. Justice Starr, for the majority, after pointing out that the defenda~ts contended that the check
"constituted an assignment" to W "of the money in the joint account,"
stated that the burden was on her to establish her title to the garnisheed
fund. He then refers to sections 189, 139 and 141 (1) of the N.I.L.4 .
declaring that ( 1) checks of themselves do not amount to an assignment and no liability on the drawee bank to the holder unless -and until
it accepts, ( 2) the classification of acceptances, into general and qualined, and (3) the definition of a qualified acceptance; and he concludes
that under these sections the bank's acceptance of W's check "was a conditional acceptance and did not operate as present assignment of the
funds in the joint account." Since the condition in such acceptance,
however, was not fulfilled until a release and dismissal of the original
Under Mich. :Acts, 1937, No·. 182, p. 275.
Sussex v. Snyder, (Mich. 1943) II N.W. (2d) 314.
8 "Collection" here manifestly is not used in its usual sense, for the debt payment
of which was called for by the check was owing by the bank itself.
4 Mich. Comp. L. (1929); §§ 9438, 9388 and 9390, Stats. Ann., §§ 19.231,
19.181 and 19.183 (1).
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writ of garnishment, at which time the bank had been served with the
second writ which reached any interest of the husband in the joint account, the bank, it is stated, had not become obligated to make payment.
Thus W "failed to establish her right and title to the funds in the joint
account." The majority opinion then goes on to point out that under an
earlier decision 5 the interest of the husband in the joint account, in
absence of proof as to amounts contributed thereto by the two joint
tenants, was to be taken as one-half and as such severable for purpose
of meeting demands of creditors; it was therefore error to hold that W
"had established right and title to the funds in the joint account and in
directing a verdict for the garnishee bank."
For the minority Mr. Justice Butzel took the position that the
N .LL. had no application and that since the bank '"considered the
money in said account "to belong to said'" W, this amounted to "an
assignment of the funds" to W subject to the garnishment being dismissed-"Although the assignment of the funds to her was conditional, the condition was met. The second garnishment did not release
the bank's obligation to pay [W] in accordance with its agreement."
Whether the case was correctly decided is, of course, of the utmost
importance to the litigants. The readers of this Review, however, are
interested only in the legal doctrines for which the decision many stand.
In so far as the case deals with acceptances, general or qualified, and
with assignments, it is respectfully submitted that the case may prove
troublesome.
While the legal relationship between a customer and his bank is
occasionally that of bailor and bailee, beneficiary and trustee, principal
and agent, by far the most common is that of creditor and debtor. In
the usual deposit situation the bank becomes a debtor and the customer a creditor.6 This debtor-creditor relationship varies from the common one between debtor and creditor in that the bank as debtor engages
not only to pay its debt, as do all debtors, but in partial payments as
ordered by the creditor-depositor by his properly drawn checks. Before
the N .LL. a number of states followed the view that a depositor by
issuing a check to another thereby assigned that much of his claim
against the bank to the checkholder. By far the greater number of states
rejected this assignment theory and the conflict was supposedly set at
rest by a section in the N .LL. declaring that a check of itself does not
amount to an assignment. Under the assignment view the checkholder
of course had an action against the drawee bank as his debtor, so the
section continued with the provision that the bank is not liable to the
holder unless and until it accepts or certifies. Even under the line of
Murphy v. Michigan Trust Co., 221 Mich. 243, 190 N.W. 698 (1922).
Customers occasionally borrow from the bank, in which situation again the relationship is debtor-creditor with the parties reversed.
5

6
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authority thus rejected by the N.LL. it was never thought that a check
drawn by a depositor in favor of himself was an assignment. An assignment necessarily contemplates not only a debtor and a creditor but also
a third party to whom the creditor makes the assignment.7 Of course
Mr. Justice Butzel is familiar with this, so he must have been using
"assignment" in some other sense, perhaps as an appropriation or setting aside of the fund by the bank for th'e wife, to be delivered or paid
when the then outstanding writ should be discharged. 8 This in turn is
suggestive of a trust. But surely there was here no trust res.
_
One may well wonder whether this approach by the le~rned justice
was not prompted by a desire not to speak of the bank's action in terms
of promise because of difficulties of consideration and possibly the requirement of the N .LL. that certifications, which are promises by the
drawee to pay, must be in writing.9 He probably was not troubled by
the latter, for he distinctly takes the position that the N.LL. had no
application to the case.
That the N .LL. had no application to the facts seems reasonably
clear. That statute is a codification, in the interest of uniformity, of the
law of negotiable instruments, not of the law of debtor and creditor
generally or even of customer and banker. Certifications are dealt with
by the N .LL. because they are placed on checks only when there is an
intent to circulate them or when they are requested by holders of checks
already in circulation.10 They thus bear upon the negotiable or circulating quality of the instrument. In the case under discussion W drew
her check and presented it to the bank for payment, not for further
circulability. She could have had no interest in a promise by the bank
7 The dissenting opinion predicates its conclusion of an assignment upon the fact
that the bank "considered the money in said account to belong to" the wife. Surely,
an assignment is accomplished by action of the creditor. The only creditor involved in
this transaction with the bank was the wife herself. There would be no point in her
making an assignment to herself as to her part of the joint account, and she was not in
position to assign her husband's part.
.
,
_8 The two opinions differ sharply as to what the bank's undertaking, if any,
really was. The majority clearly are of opinion that the bank's undertaking was to pay
when the account was freed. The minority equally clearly deem the bank's undertaking
was to pay the check when the then pending writ was discharged. As between these
two views the former seems the more likely. Only a careless or thoughtless banker would
obligate his bank to pay except as the account might be truly free of hampering writs.
9 Such writing is requir!!d by the N.I.L.
, 1 ° Checks .are certified in two classes of situations. In the first the certification is at
the request of the holder who obviously wants the credit of the bank behind the paper
instead of the secondary liability of the drawer and perhaps of indorsers. Such certifications are in effect payments of the checks (the bank at once· charges the amount to the
drawer's account) with a redeposit of the money in the bank. Jn the second situation
the certification is it the drawer's request and is desired because he wants to use the
check perhaps in making a payment somewhere or in making a deposit as a bidder.
'
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as certifier, for she already had the bank's full liability as debtor to
herself as depositor. To the extent, then, to which the bank made any
promise to W upon her presentation of the check it was merely a promise by a debtor to pay an existing debt if and when certain difficulties
were removed. Such promise was not a certification and the N .LL. had
nothing to do with it.11
The view of the majority that the transaction between the bank and
W on presentation of the check amounted to a "conditional acceptance"
though not to a present assignment seems subject to similar criticism.
Indeed what has been said above to the effect that any promise made
by the bank at that time should not be viewed as a certification is applicable here, for "acceptance" in connection with checks is simply another
way of saying "certification." Perhaps it would state the situation correctly to say that the bank found the check acceptable for payment if
and when the bank was free to pay it. Courts unfortunately have occasionally used "accept" in that sense, for example, when it is said that
every payment by a drawee must necessarily have been preceded by
acceptance.12
So far as the rights of W against the bank are concerned, at least
so far as her claim to the entire balance was concerned, the questions
would seem to be: (I) was any legally enforceable promise made by the
bank to W? (2) if there was such a promise, was it to pay when the
then outstanding writ' was discharged, or to pay when the bank was
free of all restraints, whether by that writ o~ by later ones? 13
R.W.A.
11 It has been held many times that the provisions of the N.I.L. are not applicable
to non-negotiable paper though it may be a promissory note or bill of exchange. Only
negotiable paper is covered.
12 See First N. Bank v. Whitmore, (C.C.A. 8th, 1910) 177 F. 397; National
Bank of Commerce v. Seattle N. Bank, 109 Wash. 312, 187 P. 342 (1920).
13 In the. hearing on the garnishment writ, affidavit and disclosures, apparently there
was no proof entered as to the respective shares of the husband and wife in the joint
account. The trial judge then ruled that the plaintiff had failed to show that the account belonged to the husband, the principal defendant, and he ordered a verdict for
the bank. It is a bit puzzling why at that point no application was made of Murphy v.
Michigan Trust Co. (supra note 4) holding at p. 246 that in absence of proof "the
presumption prevails that plaintiffs were equal contributors" to the account.

